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Introduction 
The visit by U.S. President George W. Bush to India and Pakistan during the first week of March 
this year is rightly viewed as a turning point in U.S. relations toward South Asia for two reasons: 
first, for formally “de-hyphenating” India and Pakistan in Washington’s worldview; and second, for 
producing a landmark agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the United 
States that will “legitimize” India’s status as a nuclear weapon state, open the door for foreign 
reactor sales and technological assistance, and bring India more fully into the international 
nuclear export control regime.  
Both of these landmark changes have been subject to tremendous debate and criticism inside 
India, the United States, and many other countries; but perhaps the most notable outcome of the 
President’s trip was a dog that did not bark—the absence of any major U.S. policy initiative on the 
longstanding India-Pakistan dispute over the political and territorial status of Kashmir.  
In the joint statements issued by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 
New Delhi and by President Bush and Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf in Islamabad, no 
reference was made to Kashmir.[1] In India, Bush told reporters, “India and Pakistan have an 
historic opportunity to work toward lasting peace. Prime Minister Singh and President Musharraf 
have shown themselves to be leaders of courage and vision. And I encourage them to continue 
making progress on all issues, including Kashmir.”[2] Bush made a similar remark in Pakistan in 
response to a journalist’s question about the long-standing dispute: “The best way for Kashmir to 
be resolved is for leaders of both countries to step up and lead.”[3] In other words, Washington 
now sees Kashmir as a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan. The United States will surely 
to try to nudge the composite dialogue forward, but it will not play a major role in trying to mediate 
a political settlement in Kashmir.  
On the one hand, the reluctance of the Bush administration to take a more active stance on the 
Kashmir dispute when so much already occupies its foreign policy agenda is understandable. 
After all, Kashmir has proved to be the most intractable territorial dispute in the world,[4] and 
attempts by previous U.S. presidents to resolve the issue (especially Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
Johnson, and Clinton) had ended in frustration and bitter feelings among all of the interested 
parties. On the other hand, this dispute has been the cause of three major India-Pakistan military 
conflicts and is the main obstacle that stands in the way of India realizing its ambition of playing a 
major political role on the world stage, an ambition that many in the Bush administration share.  
The unwillingness of the U.S. government to take a strong stand on Kashmir not only makes the 
dispute that much more difficult to resolve. But it also could have the unintended consequences 
of exacerbating political tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad, possibly producing greater 
instability inside Indian-held Kashmir, complicating what already is a precarious military situation 
along the Line of Control (LoC) that divides the portions of Kashmir that India and Pakistan 
administer, and reducing the capacity of the United States to manage the next Indo-Pakistani 
crisis.  
This essay analyzes Pakistan’s frustration with the diplomatic dialogue with India over Kashmir 
and shows how the Bush visit to South Asia, and especially the U.S. administration’s reluctance 
to take on the Kashmir question, has set in motion certain dynamics that could make South Asia 
one of the world’s most dangerous place once again unless all three governments—Washington, 
New Delhi, and Islamabad—act quickly and decisively to put the normalization of Indo-Pak 
relations back on the front burner.  
 
President Bush with the leaders of India and Pakistan in early March this year. 
Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy before the Bush Visit 
Over the last few years, Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf has led a radical transformation of 
Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute. Soon after the moribund political dialogue between 
Pakistan and India resumed in early 2004, President Musharraf jettisoned Pakistan’s fifty-plus-
year insistence that the final political disposition of Kashmir must turn on the outcome of a 
plebiscite, as mandated by the United Nations in 1948, with Kashmiris themselves deciding to join 
either India or Pakistan. Instead, Musharraf offered several fresh ideas—demilitarizing all or parts 
of Kashmir, parceling Kashmir into seven geographical regions (five currently under Indian control 
and two with Pakistan), and considering novel political formulas for each, possibly including joint 
control or a United Nations mandate. Most importantly, these novel negotiating positions were 
backed by a pledge to end Pakistani support for militancy as a means to weaken India’s hold over 
Kashmir. The dramatically reduced infiltration of Pakistan-based militants across the Line of 
Control (LoC) and the significantly lower incidence of violent attacks in Indian-held Kashmir would 
suggest that President Musharraf was sincere and that he had the power to overcome political 
and military lobbies opposed to giving up Pakistan’s covert management of the fifteen-year armed 
struggle for Kashmir.[5]  
Pakistan’s radical departure from past policies on Kashmir raises an important pair of questions 
that have bearing on the future of the Kashmir dispute, India-Pakistan relations, and the role of 
the United States in South Asia.  
· First, why did President Musharraf abandon Pakistan’s military approach to the Kashmir 
dispute? Was this a fundamental policy shift or a temporary, tactical reorientation? In 
particular, what role did the Kargil conflict, the 2002 India-Pakistan military standoff, and 
the U.S.-led global war on terrorism play in altering Pakistan’s strategic calculations?  
· Secondly, if India fails to reciprocate Pakistan’s recent flexibility at the negotiating table, 
how long will President Musharraf remain committed to a peaceful settlement of the 
Kashmir dispute? If the Indo-Pak political process breaks down again, what new policy 
will Pakistan pursue toward India and Kashmir? Should we expect a renewal of military 
instruments, such as the resumption of Pakistani support for the insurgency or even 
another Kargil-like military adventure?  
This essay draws on information gained by the author on a trip to Islamabad and Rawalpindi 
during December 13-22, 2005. What follows are two main sections organized around each of the 
question sets identified above. 
Understanding Musharraf’s Policy Shift on Kashmir 
Pakistan’s shift in strategy on Kashmir, which began in late 2001 and continues to evolve even 
now, was in part a rational response to Washington’s dramatically changed foreign policy 
priorities after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It also was a reaction to India’s intense 
military pressure after the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. But it was 
just as much an outcome of the Musharraf government’s carefully calculated strategy to alleviate 
Pakistan’s strategic overreach on its eastern and western borders and to concentrate resources 
on its economic growth and internal security.  
During the 1990s, Pakistan’s support for the Kashmir insurgency—just like its embrace of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan—had its roots in a strategic mindset that was shaped by isolation from the 
West and by a new sense of military opportunities revealed by the dramatic victory of the 
mujahideen over Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan. If religiously inspired militants trained and 
equipped by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate could defeat a superpower, surely 
they could make the Indian government pay an excessively high cost for retaining the portion of 
Kashmir it has held since the conclusion of the first Kashmir war in 1948. Especially during a 
period of “self-help” when Pakistan was isolated from the United States and other Western 
powers (after Washington’s imposition of Pressler amendment sanctions in 1990), this approach 
to the Kashmir issue made sense to a wide swath of Pakistan’s political and military leadership.  
Significantly, nobody seemed to mind. Throughout the 1990s, the United States referred to 
Kashmir as a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan, and did not put any real pressure on 
Islamabad to curtail its support for the insurgency.[6] Similarly, Europe, Japan, and even Russia 
seemed to share Washington’s concern for the plight of the Muslim majority population in 
Kashmir under an often-harsh Indian occupation and refrained from condemning Pakistan’s 
involvement in militancy. Pakistan’s policy also enjoyed China’s tacit support and Saudi Arabia’s 
active financial assistance and moral backing. Even India tolerat ed the insurgency. Although it 
blamed Pakistan for aiding the militants, it did not apply any real pressure on Islamabad to back 
off.  
However, international opinion changed dramatically after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear 
weapons tests of May 1998, a revision that Pakistan’s leadership did not fully appreciate until its 
troops were found in occupation of a 400 square kilometer section in the mountains of Indian-
controlled Kashmir in the Spring of 1999. Many complicated considerations and calculations 
motivated Pakistan’s Kargil operation, including a desire by some senior military officials (most 
notably General Musharraf’s Chief of General Staff Lt. General Muhammad Aziz, who himself is 
an ethnic Kashmiri) to resuscitate what had become a flagging insurgency in Kashmir. However, 
none of Pakistan’s military or civilian leaders appreciated that the international community now 
viewed military conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan as unacceptable and would 
move against the initiator of irresponsible military action. The Indian government also came to 
view the competition along the LoC in different terms after 1998. New Delhi was loathe to permit 
the Pakistan army to manipulate the risk of nuclear escalation to alter the territorial or political 
status quo in Kashmir, and thus reacted with unprecedented determination to oust the intruders 
from the Kargil heights.  
General Musharraf, who had approved the Kargil operation very early in his tenure as Chief of 
Army Staff, subsequently recognized that this operation had been poorly planned and/or 
executed. To this day, it is not clear if the main reason for the over-extended tactical position and 
poor preparation of Pakistani troops along the Kargil heights was caused by the exuberance of 
younger officers and terrain conditions that made oversight difficult or by the decisions of 
operational commanders, such as the 10 Corps Commander, Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed, and 
the Commander of the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General Javed Hassan, 
who might have pushed the incursion deeper for their glory and ambition. In any event, in a 
climate of rapidly deteriorating civil-military relations in Pakistan, General Musharraf was unwilling 
to acknowledge the army’s culpability in the Kargil fiasco—in part because Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif had approved the operation.[7] 
Simultaneously, he was eager to revive the political normalization process that had begun with 
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s impromptu bus ride to Pakistan and the Lahore 
declaration, but which just as rapidly foundered during the Kargil crisis.  
In the aftermath of Pakistan’s withdrawal from Kargil, and with tensions growing at the same time 
between the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Pakistan government, and intensifying U.S. 
pressure on Islamabad to distance itself from the Taliban and its al Qaeda clients, President 
Musharraf began to reconsider Pakistan’s strategy toward its eastern and western flanks. And 
then the September 11, 2001 attacks occurred. Although Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan 
and India had changed precious little on the ground prior to September 11th, the mindset of the 
Pakistan leadership had changed appreciably.  
Musharraf’s strategic nightmare scenario is for the United States to support India and Afghanistan 
in their political hostility and territorial ambitions against Pakistan. After the September 11 attacks 
this became a distinct possibility, thus Musharraf moved quickly and aggressively to alter 
Pakistan’s policies toward Kashmir and Afghanistan. To address the question this section began 
with, this was a fundamental policy shift, not a temporary, tactical reorientation of Pakistan’s 
strategic priorities. Most significantly, Pakistan no longer believes in the strategic or political utility 
of arming and training militants to fight against Indian authority in Kashmir.  
This is not to suggest that Pakistan has turned against these militant groups. Pakistani military 
and intelligence agencies now appear to be pursuing a policy of keeping close contact with all of 
the militant groups operating in and out of Pakistan. The concern in Islamabad and Rawalpindi is 
that if Pakistani authorities ban a particular group, it quickly will splinter, and once it splinters, then 
the new organizations will become more radical and less susceptible to governmental influence. 
Thus, the government continues to stay engaged with militant groups, but through its 
engagement policy, it attempts to wean them away from militant activities.  
Pakistan’s policy shift on Kashmir is very significant, but it is not necessarily permanent. The next 
question to examine is if India does not show an appreciation for the Musharraf government’s 
altered approach to the Kashmir militancy or reciprocate its positive overtures at the negotiating 
table, how long will Pakistan remain committed to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute?  
Anticipating the Future: a Return to the 1980s?  
President Musharraf has braved a considerable amount of public political opposition, and 
presumably plenty of internal dissent, in pursuing a softer policy on Kashmir. In previous 
statements, he has said that he believes that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is sincere 
about the peace process, and he has indicated his hope that Singh could prevail upon the Indian 
military and bureaucracy to accept a compromise solution with Pakistan on the Kashmir 
dispute.[8] This view of Singh was still implicit in more recent Pakistani statements, but it appears 
that after the Bush visit, Islamabad is more pessimistic about the progress of Indo-Pakistani 
talks.[9] The Pakistan leadership now seems to consider that the composite dialogue with India is 
a “fleeting opportunity” to resolve the Kashmir issue and normalize bilateral relations.  
President Musharraf seems to be genuine in his desire to permanently settle the Kashmir dispute, 
but he also now has mounting reservations about India’s sincerity and commitment to the peace 
process. He recently has discussed the proposal he made to his Indian counterpart to demilitarize 
three cities in the Vale of Kashmir. He has indicated that in order to make this a significant step 
toward peace, if India agreed, he would respond by “asking” the militants not to attack in those 
cities. He has argued that in the event of any violence from demilitarized cities, the military 
garrisons could be moved quickly back into the city, thus it did not constitute a serious concession 
by India. If successful, his proposal would ease the pressure on residents inside the city. 
Musharraf and other Pakistani leaders are frustrated that India has not responded to this, or any 
of Pakistan’s other proposals.  
After President Bush’s recent trip to South Asia, it seems clear—especially to the Pakistanis—
that India’s leadership believes that time is on its side and thus does not feel any more pressure 
to make meaningful concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir or any other bilateral dispute (e.g., 
Siachen, Sir Creek, river dams).[10] As Islamabad probably sees it, the situation is much like it 
was in mid-June 1999, when a back-channel agreement between New Delhi and Islamabad 
calling for the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Kargil heights together with an explicit 
formula for reaching an agreement on the territorial status of Kashmir, was trashed by the Indian 
government after the United States had declared its support for India’s position on the Kargil 
crisis.[11] In other words, with the Bush administration firmly in its corner, the Indian government 
is believed to be likely to continue to stonewall Pakistani negotiators if in fact it doesn’t take an 
even harder line on Pakistan and the Kashmir issue. So where does this leave Pakistan? If a 
negotiated settlement is impossible, is the choice between conceding Kashmir to India (probably 
by accepting the LoC as a permanent international border) or reviving the military struggle for 
Kashmiri independence?  
In the first place, accepting the de facto territorial division of Kashmir as a de jure political 
arrangement is not a realistic option for President Musharraf; nor would it be for any other 
Pakistani military or civilian leader. It is well known that politically such a concession would be 
suicidal (maybe even literally, too, as any number of jihadis would be willing to avenge the loss of 
Kashmir by trying to take the lives of those responsible). There is also an economic security 
consideration: Pakistanis fear that India’s current territorial control in Kashmir gives it the ability to 
cut off or divert vital sources of water needed for Pakistani agriculture. Military logic also governs 
Pakistani policy toward Kashmir. Rightly or wrongly, the Pakistan army believes that unrest in 
Kashmir ties down 400,000 to 500,000 Indian soldiers, which could otherwise be positioned on 
the border against Pakistan. Another consideration is that in the event of a future conventional 
war between India and Pakistan, Kashmiri militants could be expected to rise against India from 
its rear positions, thus complicating India’s military strategy and negating, at least temporarily, 
India’s otherwise superior firepower and manpower. Most importantly, if Islamabad abandons the 
Kashmir card, the leadership’s concern is that Pakistan would be defenseless to prevent India 
from asserting its growing military, economic, and political advantages in a concerted coercive 
campaign to turn Pakistan into a “West Bangladesh,” a weak country that must meekly comply 
with India’s will. Obviously, such an outcome is totally unacceptable to Pakistani leaders, who 
believe themselves responsible for protecting the nation’s sovereignty and ensuring that Pakistan 
remains a safe haven for the Muslims of South Asia.  
If submission is not an option, is revival of the armed insurgency a likely response to the failure of 
the political normalization process? Fortunately, the answer is probably not. Although there no 
doubt are advocates within senior Pakistan army ranks for a return to the heady military strategy 
of the 1990s, President Musharraf almost certainly would oppose such an approach. It would 
complicate his efforts to revive the country’s economy; it would empower the jihadi groups that 
already threaten Pakistan’s internal security; and most importantly, it would enable India, perhaps 
this time aided by the United States, to mount ferocious military pressure on Islamabad. 
Especially at a time when tensions are so high between the Afghan and Pakistani governments, 
the Musharraf government is looking for ways to alleviate foreign pressures, not to aggravate 
them.  
Islamabad’s probable response to a breakdown of the Indo-Pak political process is thus not likely 
to be a significant revival of violence in Kashmir. Nor will it be a concession. The most likely 
outcome will be a return to the wait-and-see policy of the 1980s. During this period, Islamabad 
maintained its contacts with militant groups, but discouraged militant violence and instead 
pursued a largely moral and diplomatic strategy toward the Kashmir dispute. Such an approach, if 
it occurred again, would not be an end in and of itself, but rather a strategy to gain breathing 
space and buy time for Islamabad to shore up its economic, political, and military might in order to 
fight for Kashmir on another day.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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